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INTRODUCTION 
Learning in the human adult has been regarded as a conceptual 
process in which knowledge about the world (e.g., objects or entities) 
is organized into categories or concepts (Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 
1956). Each category is based on a set of physical characteristics 
or attributes, which serve to define all of the objects which could 
be placed into that category. For example, "triangles" is a category 
of all things having the same basic shape; in this case, shape is 
called a 'relevant* attribute or dimension. Since triangles may be 
of any size, color or texture, these dimensions are said to be 
irrelevant to the concept. 
In many laboratory studies of human discrimination learning, the 
subjects are presented with a series of objects or pictures of objects 
which vary on two or more dimensions, and are expected to leam to 
discriminate the objects on the basis of one dimension, disregarding 
the others. This same task has been used in countless studies, though 
it has been called both attribute identification (AI), as in Bourne 
(1966), and discrimination learning, as in Trabasso & Bower (1968), 
It has been shown that the normal adult attacks the AI task in a 
systematic manner by selecting an hypothesis or trial concept and 
responding on the basis of that concept consistently until it produces 
an error. After an error trial, the subject selects a new hypothesis 
(Levine, 1966). If a subject has actually reached a conceptual 
solution in an AI situation, he would be expected to; 1) state a 
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verbal rule which defines the class of positive stimuli; and/or 
2) respond with minimal error (transfer) to a series of new stimuli 
exhibiting the same relevant dimensions. 
But the picture is not so clear when the conceptual behavior of 
a young child is in question. Children are generally approached dif­
ferently than adults—instructions are simplified, problem difficulty 
is greatly reduced, greater emphasis is placed on rewards, the task 
is presented as a game rather than a problem. When the 'child* 
happens to be an adult who has the Mental Age of a young child, the 
experimental approach is simplified even more. The net result of 
these natural tendencies to vary (i.e., soften) the approach when 
evaluating the conceptual abilities of a less capable population has 
been to measure those abilities on a scale that is not compatible with 
the scale devised for normal adults, making true comparisions of the 
populations impossible. 
In the following paragraphs, several theoretical, methodological, 
and statistical foundations for developmental comparisions of attribute 
identification skills will be examined as to their impact on the field 
of mental retardation and cognition. It is the purpose of this in­
vestigation to explore the possibility that by eliminating procedural 
biases, the mechanics and dynamics of conceptual learning in the 
retarded can be drawn into the mainstream of human cognitive theory 
and research. 
Mediation Theories of Discrimination Learning 
Theoretical accounts of the human AI learning process have 
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consistently"called upon an implicit response to mediate reception 
of physical stimuli and the overt responses to those stimuli. The 
mediator has usually been conceived of as a perceptual or verbal 
response which highlights individual dimensional components of the 
stimulus. Different theorists have used a variety of terms, but 
all of the terms, e.g., coding response (Lawrence, 1963), mediating 
response (Kendler & Kendler, 1969), observing response (Zeaman & 
House, 1963),'orienting response (Goodwin & Lawrence, 1955), and 
sampling response (Polidora & Fletcher, 1964), appear to refer to 
a common selector process. 
IWo of the above theorists have expounded on the mediation 
mechanism in an attempt to account for developmental changes in 
conceptual ability. Kendler and Kendler (1962) have adopted a 
binary model based on the presence or absence of an ability to 
associate a physical stimulus with an implicit verbal labeling re­
sponse. Cues produced by this response, when added to the stimulus 
complex, then elicit the conceptual response. Prior to the tran­
sition to mediated learning, said to occur around 5 to 6 years of 
age, the child's learning is based on single-unit associational 
principles. 
The attention theory of Zeaman and House (1963), on the other 
hand, proposes that the mediating response is perceptual in nature 
and, rather than adding stimulation, serves to limit the amount of 
effective stimulation to isolated dimensions of the stimuli. On each 
discrimination trial, the subject makes a chain of two responses; 
4 
first, a dimensional observing response is elicited followed by an 
approach response to one cue on the selected dimension. The proba­
bility of observing a given dimension (P^) is subject to the same 
lavs of reinforcement and extinction as ordinary instrumental 
responses. Until the relevant dimension is observed, no learning 
of the relevant cues takes place. 
The attention model holds that the development of conceptual 
ability is a function of changes in the relative strengths of 
relevant observing responses. It does not postulate any substantive 
changes in the nature of the learning process as the individual 
matures. 
Most of the research supporting a developmental transition, 
e.g., Kendler & Kendler (1959); Kendler, Kendler 6e Wells (1960), 
has been based on numerous variations of the popular concept shift 
paradigm. In problems of this type subjects who have succeeded on 
a unidimensional AI task are presented a second AI (shift) task 
without delay or warning. Two basic types of shift or transfer 
tasks have been used. If the subject is asked to sort the stimuli 
on the basis of a new dimension, the task constitutes an extra-
dimensional (ED) shift. If the relevant dimension remains the same, 
but all previously positive instances are now assigned to the 
negative category and vice versa, the task is called a reversal 
shift (RS). Although this design has been vigorously attacked and 
modified because of methodological problems (Slamecka, 1968), it 
remains as the prototype for much current research. 
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Inferences drawn from the shift paradigm by the Kendlers are 
basically simple. If a child is learning by directly associating 
overt responses with stimulus cues, the RS task should be the more 
difficult of the two shifts, as it alone requires that all previous 
associations be extinguished. If, however, the child's learning is 
mediated, the ED shift should be the more difficult, as it requires 
a new mediating response whereas the RS mediator is unchanged. 
These inferences generated a landslide of studies which served 
to cast serious doubts on the validity of the association-mediation 
transition. In a comprehensive review of concept-shift literature, 
Wolff (1967) concluded that there is no acceptable evidence that 
children below the age of 5 leam shift problems in a single-unit 
associative manner. Investigators have shown that a reversal shift 
was solved more rapidly than an ED shift by groups of kindergarten 
children (Smiley & Weir, 1966), preschool children, (Dickerson, 1967), 
3-year-olds (Caron, 1969), and retardates with 2- to 4-year mental 
ages (House & Zeaman, 1962; Heal, Bransky & Mankinen, 1966). 
Shepp & Zeaman (1966), after reviewing concept-shift studies 
using retarded subjects, also found reversal learning to be faster 
than ED shift learning. They concluded that this mediating process 
appears to characterize the behavior of rats as well as the behavior 
of normal and retarded children. Wolff (1967) added that: 
The majority of the evidence indicates that retardate 
[shiftQ behavior is fully consistent with a two-stage 
model, as Zeaman and House have indicated. This would sug­
gest either that retardates are not so deficient in verbal 
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mediation as many have supposed or that the operation of 
verbal mediating responses is not necessarily implied by 
ID intra-dimensional shift superiority (p. 384). 
Both of the models seek to analyze the phenomenon of dimensional 
responding during discrimination learning, which cannot be adequately 
explained with single-unit theory. The Kendlers' mediation model, 
with its conception of a developmental shift from associative to 
mediated learning, provokes the suggestion that in mental retardation 
this transition may be delayed, defective, or completely absent. In 
his review of concept formation research, Kendler (1961) made the 
following statement about the position tal-en by the Russian psycholo­
gist, Luria: 
As the child matures, the verbal behavior, which may 
be implicit or explicit, gradually comes to mediate and 
regulate overt behavior. Behavior that is conditioned 
without verbal associations is relatively unstable, is 
dependent on constant reinforcement, and disintegrates 
at a slight change in the manner of presenting the 
signals. Behavior that is conditioned via verbal as­
sociations is quickly acquired, very stable, and 
generalizes widely. Normal humans from 5% years of 
age and on tend to operate via verbal control, whereas 
younger children and mental retardates do not. The 
implications of this position are as interesting as 
they are congruent with the media ted-response analysis. 
However, not all the data supporting it are available 
in English; corroborative work needs to be done (p. 465). 
Thus, no consistent evidence in support of a generalized lack of 
mediated learning ability in the retarded has been produced, yet for 
nearly half a century such an assumption has pervaded the realm of 
special education. Application of this premise to methods of teaching 
preschool children has generated the idea that this population is 
generally incapable of conceptual thought. The resultant dilemma 
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was aptly stated by lano (1971); 
The emphasis is on such ideas as that the retarded 
tend to be rote rather than meaningful learners; that they 
are poor in reasoning, comprehension, and the ability to 
generalize or transfer; and that they leam best through 
autranatic drill and repetitive practice. Rote memori­
zation of the curriculum is then encouraged, with a de-
emphasis on underlying meanings, conceptual understanding, 
and generalized principles.... 
...As a consequence, the teacher's preconceptions of 
the children's learning characteristics are confirmed and 
strengthened: retarded children leam by rote and 
repetition, they easily forget what they have learned, 
and they fail to generalize. In this way, the behaviors 
encouraged by restrictive teaching strategies confirm 
preconceptions which led to those strategies in the 
first place (pp. 307-308). 
How, then, is the cognitive capacity of the retarded individual 
to be identified and explained so that existing preconceptions can be 
altered? More basically, what theoretical orientation provides a 
framework which will enable basic conceptual ability in the retarded 
to be demonstrated and, subsequently, developed? 
Instead of searching for structural deficits in learning mecha­
nisms, it would seem profitable to examine more closely the way in 
which retarded subjects interact with the actual stimulus variables. 
Such an approach does support the research strategy used by Zeaman 
and House (1963), as follows: 
The attention hypothesis (that retardates suffer from 
low initial probability of observing certain relevant di­
mensions rather than from poor ability to leam which of 
two observed cues is correct) is to us a hopeful and 
exciting notion because it leads so quickly to a search 
for experimental operations that may change q) 
hence accelerate discriminations of subjects who might 
otherwise seem to be natively and irreversibly poor 
discriminators (p. 188). 
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A strikingly similar strategy is implied in the perceptual-
differentiation theory of Tighe and Tighe (1966). They contend 
that the developing individual becomes increasingly sensitive to 
variables or differences in stimulation, a process called perceptual 
learning. It is the ability to detect and use new and more exact 
stimulus differences which determines the facility of dis cri,mi nation 
learning. Individual and developmental differences in discrimination 
ability would be based on varying opportunities for and experiences 
with perceptual learning. The fact that retarded individuals, 
especially those confined to institutions, do have a notoriously 
restricted perceptual learning milieu would suggest that this is a 
tenable research area. 
Differentiation theory holds that reinforcement during dis­
crimination learning tends to focus attention on those stimulus 
properties which are perceived in relation to it. Treatments which 
serve to emphasize the relevant stimulus differences should tend to 
facilitate discrimination learning. Tighe (1965) gave 5- and 6-year-
old children pretraining in rendering same-different judgements of 
stimuli varying independently in height and in brightness. A 
control group received pretraining unrelated to the tasks involved. 
Subjects with perceptual pretraining learned a reversal shift 
significantly faster than an ED shift. Control Ss showed no dif­
ferences between the two shifts. 
Further evidence showed that 6- to 7-year-olds made fewer 
errors on a reversal shift problem given that they had made below-
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median errors on a concept of dimensionality test (Johnson & White, 
1967). The test, similar to the Tighes' pretraining, required 
subjects to order two series of stimuli, which varied along each 
dimension of the shift task (size and brightness). The same 
investigators (White & Johnson, 1968) showed that children aged 3 to 
6 years were more likely to make an optional reversal shift if they 
made few errors on the dimensionality test. With these younger 
children, ease of mandatory RS learning was not related to test 
scores. 
It can be argued that highlighting the dimensional properties 
of the stimuli enabled young children to later make use of the 
dimensional concept during an RS task. It can also be generally 
stated the concept-shift performance is related to an ability to 
respond to the relevant dimensional properties of the stimuli. 
Despite a mild controversy between attentional and differ­
entiation theorists over the relative importance of stimulus- and 
subject-oriented variables, there seems to be fundamental agreement 
on the following three principles: 
1) human learning ability is affected by individual differences 
in perceptual biases; 
2) perceptual habits are subject to change while basic learning 
mechanisms are not; 
3) conceptual learning ability will be demonstrated to the 
degree that the subjects perceptual biases are congruent with the 
requirements of the discrimination or AI task presented to them. 
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Each of the principles can serve to direct the researcher's 
attention to a class of treatment variables and a large body of 
research: 
1) effects of differential preferences or biases for attending 
to various stimulus dimensions ; 
2) effects of pretraining via instructional set; 
3) effects of the amount and type of irrelevant variation in 
the stimuli. 
Each class of variables will be examined and applied to the 
study of conceptual learning ability in the mentally retarded in the 
following paragraphs. 
Dimension Preference and Ease of Learning 
There has been a recent flurry of interest in the question of 
whether or not a subject's perceptual preferences for stimulus 
dimensions should affect the difficulty of a discrimination task. 
If a preference implies high attentional value (PQ) for that dimension, 
then decreasing the relevance of the preferred dimension should serve 
to increase the difficulty of the task; the greater the relevance, the 
smoother the course of learning. 
Numerous studies have shown that over 70% of the children and 
adults used as subjects demonstrated definite preferences for specific 
stimulus dimensions. They also show that the preferences form a 
developmental progression from color to form (Brian & Goodenough, 
1929; Kagan & Lemkin, 1961; Corah, 1964; Suchman & Trabasso, 1966a). 
The younger child's strong response to color has been interpreted as 
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a reaction to the more global, diffuse character of the color 
dimension (Corah, Jones & Miller, 1966), and may be based on an 
impulsive type of response rather than on an actual preference 
(White, 1964). The child over approximately 5 years of age is said 
to be more likely to respond to form because of the increased 
emphasis upon this dimension in his academic training (Lee, 1965). 
However, many older children and adults, as well as young children, 
will either prefer color or respond equally to both dimensions. 
Prior to 1966, the suggestion that dimension preference was 
related to learning rate was based solely on indirect evidence. 
Problems with color as a relevant dimension were learned faster than 
form problems by nursery school children (Lee, 1965), while form 
problems-were learned faster by older children (Calvin & Clifford, 
1956) and by adults (Kendler, 1961). Direct evidence was obtained 
by Suchman and Trabasso (1966b), when they found that 4- and 5-year-
old children learned an AX task fastest when the problem was based 
on their preferred dimension, whether color or form. These results 
were extended by Crane and Ross (1967) to 2nd- and 6th-grade children 
and by Wolff (1966) to a color vs. height AX task using 6-year-olds. 
Several studies have suggested that older children are less 
affected by dimensional salience than are younger children. Odom and 
Mumbauer (1971) presented a two-choice AI task with color or form 
relevant to groups of subjects in grades 1, 5, 7, 10, and college. 
All S^s had demonstrated form preferences. No groups differed in 
performance on the task with form relevant; only the 1st- and 5th-
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graders had difficulty with the (non-preferred) color task. Odom 
and Guzman (1972) assessed the preference hierarchy (form, color, 
position, and number) in a large sample of children 5 to 12 years 
of age. The relative salience of a dimension was negatively as­
sociated with number of errors on an identity test using the same 
dimensions. The salience effect was most predominant with ^s in the 
5 to 8 year range. Using a more complex matching-to-sample AI task, 
Mitler and Harris (1969) found preference to be related to ease of 
solution for kindergarten, Ist-grade, and 3rd-grade children. A 
closer analysis of their results shows that form-dominant 1st-
graders performed best on a color-relevant task. The dominance 
effect was only slight for 3rd-graders. They concluded that the 
over-all dominance effect was probably due to the kindergarten sample. 
Similar, though less extensive, evidence is available with 
retarded ^s. Using a color-form sorting task, Halpin (1958) found 
more color than form preferences. As mental age (MA) increased from 
3 to 10 years and chronological age increased from 7 to 14, fewer 
preferences were demonstrated, with more ^ s being able to sort on 
both dimensions. Wilcock and Venables (1968) discovered a relation­
ship between preference and ease of solving a matching-to-sample task 
in a group of severely retarded subjects. Retardates with Down's 
syndrome, who were predominantly color dominant, made four times as 
many errors with form problems as with color problems. Other retar­
dates and normal subjects, who showed slightly more form dominance 
than color dominance, made more errors on the color problem. This 
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evidence would have been more impressive, however, if the author had 
compared scores of tasks based on the preferred vs. non-preferred 
dimensions. 
Preference groups have also been compared in several studies of 
RS learning with both retarded and normal children. Subjects who 
originally learned an AI problem with the preferred dimension relevant 
learned it rapidly, and then learned the reversal shift of the cues 
faster than they learned an ED shift; those trained on the non-
preferred dimension took significantly more trials to learn and 
showed no RS superiority. This pattern of results has been found 
with normal 3-year-olds (Caron, 1969), preschool children (Mumbauer 
& Odom, 1967), kindergarten students (James, O'Brien & Brinley, 1969; 
Smiley & Weir, 1966), and retarded subjects, iQs 36 to 67 (Heal, 
Bransky & Mankinen, 1966). 
Effects of Irrelevant Variability 
The foregoing research on dimensional preference would indicate 
that individual differences in such perceptual variables may be a 
critical factor in research devoted to locating and treating the 
deficiencies of retardate learning. The fact that one dimension is 
perceptually dominant over another may be responsible for much of the 
difficulty in learning to generalize concepts. Such learning in­
volves continued attention to one dimension, despite new variations 
on one or more irrelevant dimensions. If the child's dominant 
dimension is included in the concept as irrelevant, he may shift 
his focus of attention to that dimension when it is introduced. He 
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would be unable to identi^ the correct concept unless he could 
shift his attention away frran the dominant dimension, which has 
been found to be difficult for normal preschool children (Kofsl^ 
& Osier, 1967). 
Additional dimensions can be introduced into an AI task so that 
the new stimulus variability constitutes; 1) irrelevant variability 
within trials (IW)—two or more values of the dimension are presented 
on each multiple-choice trial or, with successive presentation, the 
dimension is available as the basis for a response choice on every 
trial; 2) irrelevant variability between trials (IB)—the two values 
are present on separate trials (this condition is impossible with 
conventional successive presentation); 3) redundant relevant cue 
variability (BRC)—every value of a relevant dimension is compounded 
with only one value of each other relevant dimension. 
The Zeaman-House model (1963) makes no theoretical distinction 
between the effects of IB and IW variability. They do state that, 
intuitively, the IW cues should retard learning to a greater degree. 
Increasing the number of relevant dimensions (RRC) should improve 
learning, as the P^s for those dimensions would be additive. In­
creasing the number of irrelevant dimensions may either facilitate, 
retard, or have no effect on learning speed, depending on the 
relative P^s of the competing dimensions. 
Current hypothesis-testing models of adult concept learning 
(Bourne & Restle, 1959; Bower & Trabasso, 1964) are in general agree­
ment with the Zeaman-House model except that they state that the 
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addition of irrelevant stimulus dimensions to an AI task will increase 
the difficulty of the task. This hypothesis has been confirmed in 
extensive studies by Bourne & Haygood (1959) using college students, 
and by Osier & Kofsky (1965) using 4-, 6-, and 8-year-old children. 
Similar results have been found with retarded subjects when pre­
sented two-choice AI tasks (Lubker, 1967; Evans, 1968) and oddity 
tasks (Lubker & Spiker, 1966; Lubker & Small, 1969). 
As yet there is no direct comparison of all three types of 
variability, though several studies have made IB vs. IW comparisons. 
In the Lubker (1967) study, 3rd- and 4th-grade children solved a 
form AI task with two IB dimensions, but failed to solve similar 
tasks with one or two IW dimensions. Lubker (1969) followed with a 
more extensive study of the same population, in which 0, 1, or 2 
irrelevant dimensions were presented either IB or IW. Tasks with IW 
variability were significantly disrupted relative to IB variability. 
There were no reliable differences between problems having 1 or 2 
irrelevant dimensions. In the Dickerson (1967) study, IW variability 
was also more difficult for kindergarten children, though the tasks 
constituted ED shifts from a previous discrimination. The results did 
suggest, however, that attention is more readily shifted away from an 
irrelevant dimension when it varies between trials. A recent study 
by Evans & Beedle (1970) found no over-all effect of IB vs. IW 
brightness variability for retardates, MA 5 to 10 years. However, 
nested within this factor was a comparison of two degrees of size IW 
variability (% cm. vs. 2% cm. differential); performance was 
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significantly impaired when size differences were increased, i.e., 
when size was made a more obvious IW cue. The possibility of in-
advertant confounding of two IW cues makes the authors * conclusion 
equivocal. 
Hypothesis-testing models also predict that increasing the 
number of redundant relevant dimensions will improve learning rate. ' 
This has been confirmed by Bourne & Haygood (1961) and by Trabasso 
& Bower (1968). The latter investigators showed that RRC learning 
may transfer to either one or to both dimensions of the task; transfer 
was demonstrated with non-reinforced test stimuli having only one of 
the relevant dimensions present. Their cue-selection theory accurately 
predicted that RRC learning rate and transfer accuracy were functions 
of the relative difficulties of the single-cue problems. To date, 
the RRC paradigm has not been used in research with the mentally 
retarded. 
Based on the above findings, it was predicted that the subjects 
in the present investigation would find an IW task more difficult than 
an IB task; both tasks would be more difficult than an RRC task, using 
the same dimensions. It was anticipated that dimension preferences 
will serve to heighten the effects of dimension variability. Further­
more, it was expected that on tests of RRC transfer retarded subjects 
would show little or no learning of the non-preferred dimension, but 
would exhibit learning of the preferred dimension. 
Effects of Instructional Set 
Assuming that the demonstration of a definite dimension preference 
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on a matching test indicates the availability of that dimensional 
concept, then the conditions that affect the usability of the concept 
can be examined independently (Mitler & Harris, 1969). Treatments 
such as dimensional training, verbal labeling, and overtraining have 
all been shown to improve concept usability as reflected in learning 
transfer tasks. However, one very important methodological factor 
has been largely ignored in the experimental literature, that of 
instructional set. The possible significance of this variable has 
been discussed, as in the following statement by White (1966): 
If S is given substantial training on a conceptual problem, 
he will a hypothesis-tester. If given training on a 
problem that requires another strategy.he will learn an 
appropriate strategy and his data will reflect the usage of 
that strategy in subsequent conceptual tasks. Presumably, 
instructions may serve the same function (p. 12). 
The importance of instructional set has also been emphasized by 
Bruner et al. (1955): 
What does the person take on as the objective of his [prob­
lem solving] behavior?...The first consideration here is 
whether or not the person is consciously or 'reportedly' 
seeking a concept (p. 56). 
If the subject is not seeking a conceptual solution, but attempts to 
memorize the stimuli in rote fashion, he will show little evidence of 
a conceptual solution when expected to transfer his learning to new 
stimuli. His general capability to form a conceptual solution, how­
ever, has not yet been determined. 
In most studies of adult AI learning, the subjects are informed 
directly that they are to identify which dimension is the correct 
basis for sorting or catagorizing the stimuli. They are also commonly 
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Informed of the dimensions that are involved in the task. Add this 
to their years of academic experience in discovering and manipulating 
conceptual materials, and the result is a strong 'set' to seek a 
consistent rule for solving the problem. 
Conversely, in most studies of AI learning in children, subjects 
are only told to find which stimuli are correct. Any set for a con­
ceptual solution must come from within the subject, who has had 
little supervised experience in such situations. If the subject is 
an institutionalized retarded person, he may never have received 
reinforcement for conceptual thought or problem solving behavior. 
Comparisions of adult and child conceptual abilities may, there­
fore, be biased in favor of the adults. Capabilities of the child 
and retardate may be under-estimated, especially on the simple types 
of AI tasks usually presented, whenever concept-orienting instructions 
are not given. 
The available evidence related to this question is limited, but 
consistent. For example. Reed (1946) demonstrated that more adult 
subjects had learned a simple rule for categorizing when given 
specific instructions to that effect (86%) than when instructed to 
leam stimulus names (67%). Later, Weiss (1954) ran a study specifi­
cally designed to compare the effects of specificity of instructions. 
Results showed that preschool children learned faster under each of 
two conditions: informing them that one stimulus will always be 
correct and calling the child's attention to the relevant dimensions 
of the stimuli. 
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Osier and Fivel (1961) suggested that self-instructional 
activities of more intelligent children may have led to their 
superiority over normal children on a concept identification task 
which used very general instructions. Only the more intelligent 
subjects acted like hypothesis testers. The concepts used in the 
tasks were Bird, Animal, and Living Thing. In a replication of the 
study (Osier & Weiss, 1962) the problem to be solved was defined 
more clearly and the subjects were directed to test hypotheses. With 
the more specific concept-orienting instructions, the differences due 
to intelligence disappeared. This change was due entirely to improve­
ment in the normal group. 
In more recent years, little systematic attention has been given 
to the instructional variable. The only study found to date which 
looked at simple dimensional concepts involved kindergarten children 
given matching-to-sample tasks (Levin & Hamermesh, 1967). When ^  was 
only given the instruction, 'if you do really well on this game and 
make the red light come on often enough, you will get these prizes to 
keep*, none of the Ss solved the problem. However, the addition of 
the sentence, 'if you look carefully at all three pictures you can 
figure out how to make the red light come on all the time', signifi­
cantly increased the proportion of solvers. This sentence tells the 
child that some characteristic of the stimuli consistently determines 
which choice will be correct, and that the expects him to leam what 
that characteristic is. The instruction then fills both conditions 
outlined by Weiss (1954). 
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The only evidence relating instructions to performance in AI 
situations requires a post-hoc comparison of conditions in similar 
studies. IWo such comparisions are presented below. 
1) Lubker (1967) presented an AI task having 2 IW dimensions to 
children 8 to 10 years of age. Their instructions were not concept-
oriented and the ^ s * performance remained at chance levels throughout 
the full 72 trials. Klugh and Janssen (1966) presented the identical 
task to retarded adults with M&s of 3 to 8 years and to normal 
children, 5 to 6 years of age. Their instructions were concept-
oriented and, after on 56 trials, 78% of the retardates and 50% of 
the normals reached criterion. 
2) Two studies presented kindergarten children with an AI task 
based on either the preferred or the non-preferred dimension. Smiley 
and Weir (1966) used only one irrelevant (IW) dimension, but omitted 
the concept-orienting instructions. All ^ s learned the dominant dis­
crimination, while over 33% of the Ss had failed to leam the non-
dominant task after 100 trials. Suchman and Trabasso (1966b), how­
ever, used a more difficult task (3 IW dimensions), but gave concept-
orienting instructions. The dominant dimension was learned faster 
than the non-dominant dimension, but nearly all ^ s were able to reach 
criterion within 32 trials. 
In the present investigation the two types of instructions 
described above were to be compared as to their effects on acquisition 
of simple AI problems by moderately retarded adults. If concept-
orienting instructions do actually serve to improve the usability of 
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dimensional responding, they should yield more rapid learning 
relative to traditional stimulus-orienting instructions. 
Delineation of Strategy Behavior 
Traditional descriptions of discrimination performance have 
centered around a plot of trials against percentage of correct 
responses. Because individual curves are too irregular to interpret 
and too cumbersome to publish, most researchers have chosen to plot 
the average performance of an entire group. The form of the resultant 
learning curve has often been presented as evidence for various basic 
processes involved in learning. But to what extent is the form of 
the group curve, and thus the nature of the underlying process, 
characteristic of the individual learner? 
It has been-recognized that large groups are commonly hetero­
geneous, with individuals reaching criterion on widely differing 
trials (Sidman, 1952). Since such differences can be obscured when 
scores are averaged, Hayes (1953) placed subjects (rats learning a 
brightness discrimination) into more homogeneous groups according to 
the trials on shich they made the final error. The learning curves 
were no longer negatively accelerated—prior to the criterion, per­
formance hovered about the chance level; at criterion, the curves all 
rose rapidly to maximum performance. The only characteristic dis­
tinguishing the groups was the length of the pre-criterion phase. 
Hayes also demonstrated that the shape of the individual learning 
curves can be retained in a group average curve, if the data are 
plotted on an abscissa where each point represents X trials before 
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reaching criterion. Such a plot has been called the 'backward 
learning curve *. 
In all of their comprehensive studies of discrimination learning 
in the retarded, Zeaman and House (1963) have used the backward 
learning analysis, since the retarded, especially those in insti­
tutions, are by definition, a deviant, heterogeneous population. 
They have consistently found the characteristic of chance performance 
followed by rapid solution, even with the severely retarded. As the 
Mental Age (MA.) of the subjects dropped, the length of the chance 
phase increased and the percentage of eventual learners dropped. 
The most common interpretation of the phase of chance responding 
is that it represents a period where the subject is shifting the focus 
of his observing response (attention) from one dimension to another. 
For some theorists, a shift represents the rejection of one hypothesis 
and selection of another (Krechevsky, 1938; Trabasso & Bower, 1968). 
To others, the shift is less voluntary, being based only on the 
relative probabilities of each observing response (Zeaman & House, 
1963). Shepp and Zeaman (1966) later found the length of the pre-
criterion phase to be directly related to the degree of difficulty of 
both size and brightness discriminations (based on absolute magnitude 
of physical differences between positive and negative cues). All seem 
to agree, though, that the initial probability of selecting or 
observing a given dimension is based on prior experience and individual 
preferences. These probabilities should be a major factor in deter­
mining the length of the pre-criterion phase and, thus, in the 
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difficulty of the learning task. 
Many investigators have felt that the pre-solution behavior their 
subjects displayed was systematic to a certain degree, and that their 
choices represented trial solutions based on irrelevant dimensions. 
There have been only a few attempts to actually decode pre-solution 
behavior in AI learning situations. Harlow's (1950) method of 
identifying error factors was used with retarded subjects by 
Baumeister (1966) and by Ellis, Girardeau, and Pryor (1962). This 
method provides a usable summary of a subject's response to error 
trials, but does not sample responses leading to reward. Levine 
(1963) felt that deduction of a subject's learning strategy should 
be based on both correct and incorrect choice trials; he designated a 
correct choice on trial n as a 'win', an incorrect choice as a 'lose*. 
On trial n+1, the subject could repeat his response with respect to a 
given stimulus dimension ('stay') or he could respond to the opposite 
cue ('shift'). For every stimulus dimension, including position in 
two-choice tasks, the subject's response to any n+1 trial must be 
described, with respect to the previous outcome, as either win-stay, 
win-shift, lose-stay, or lose-shift. 
Levine then generated a list of response sequences by considering 
all possible pairs of the above responses; these sequences operationally 
defined a set of four basic hypotheses (Hs) or inferred strategies. 
Two of the Hs are called Response-set Hs; they are win-stay:lose-stay 
(response perseveration) and win-shift:lose-shift (response alternation). 
The remaining two Hs are called Prediction Hs or Outcome-Contingent Hs, 
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since the response (stay or shift) differs with the outcome of the 
preceeding trial; they are win-stay;lose shift (predicts that the 
correct cue remains the same) and win-shift:lose stay (predicts that 
the correct cue will alternate). Obviously, if the subject applies 
the win-stay:lose-shift H to the relevant dimension of the task 
consistently, he will have achieved the solution. 
Levine's (1963) method of deriving quantitative measures for 
the various Hs is based on the frequencies of the four original 
response types (win- or lose-stay and win- or lose-shift). Fre­
quencies for the appropriate pairs of response types are summed to 
yield scores for each of the four Hs. Because the shift vs. stay 
pairs of Hs are complementary, Levine devised a differential score 
(D-score) to evaluate the difference in strength between members of 
each pair of complementary Hs. For example, if 70% of the responses 
had represented position perseveration, then the remaining 30% would 
represent position alternation; the D-score would reflect the dif­
ference in these two proportions. 
To date, only four discrimination learning studies have been 
found which used modifications of the D-score (Hill, 1965; Harter, 
1967; Harter, Brown & Zigler, 1971; Moffit & Coates, 1969). The 
latter three studies involved retarded subjects. The D-score measure 
was sensitive to several treatment variables and did appear to have a 
certain amount of face validity when viewed as a summary of discrete 
response frequencies. However, it has serious shortcomings if it is 
to be interpreted as a measure of an absolute amount of strategy or 
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hypothesis-testing behavior. The term, strategy, implies that a 
series of consecutive choices are made on the basis of a consistent 
rule. The D-score says nothing about the number of consecutive 
instances of a given H; it was designed to evaluate 2nd trial re­
sponses of learning set tasks and only reflects frequencies of dis­
crete events. Furthermore, because of the artificial pairing of the 
Individual response types, e.g., win-stay added to both lose-stay 
and win-shift, all of the resultant H measures carry the onus of 
being post-hoc, confounded statistics. 
In a study of oddity learning using preschool children, Croll 
(1970) analyzed consecutive 6-trial blocks. A given strategy was 
said to have occurred in a block, if all six responses were consis­
tent with that one strategy. While the technique was somewhat 
sensitive to localized strategies, it proved able to identify only 
the strongest and most consistently used strategies, those being 
solution and stimulus perseveration. In addition, the strength of 
a strategy response in a given subject could not be determined, nor 
could the strength of the group effects be readily subjected to 
statistical tests. 
Fellows (1968) has suggested an alternative to strategy pre­
ference measures such as the D-score. He proposed a measure (desig­
nated here as the H-score) which would reflect the length of con­
secutive runs by an 2 on each of Levine's Hs. The H-score would show 
the extent to which an H had dominated periods of responding. It 
would not, of course, indicate how many periods occurred and how they 
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were related; such information, though valuable, would require lengthy 
qualitative analysis of individual response patterns. 
Currently, the usefulness of the H-score has not been tested in 
actual experimental condition. Therefore, an H-score analysis will 
be applied to the results of the present investigation with the hope 
that it will provide a viable description of the seemingly random 
responding which often precedes AI solution. If the H-score also 
proves to be sensitive to factors which affect problem difficulty, 
it may provide a valuable tool for the diagnosis and remediation of 
conceptual learning disabilities. 
Summary of Research Objectives 
The major goal of the present investigation was to clarify the 
cognitive capabilities of the mentally retarded by careful examination 
of the dynamics of attribute-identification learning. It was felt 
that this population is amenable to both the methods and the theories 
of cognitive research with normal adults. To this end, four research 
areas, described in the foregoing pages, have been selected for study; 
three of these areas offer methods which, though commonly used with 
normal populations, have not been systematically applied to retarded 
groups. These methods are: 1) instructions specifically designed to 
orient the Ss to the concept-identification aspects of the task; 2) use 
of the Redundant-Relevant-Cue paradigm; and 3) quantitative measures 
of sequential response patterns or inferred strategies. The fourth 
research area, the effects of dimension preferences, has frequently 
been applied to retarded groups via the discrimination-shift paradigm. 
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However, it is felt that if the preference variable is a viable 
construct, then its effects should be apparent in AI tasks having 
differing forms of dimensional variability. 
Based on the above general research strategy, the present study 
has been divided into four major areas of concern. 
1 - Dimensional Variability. The moderately retarded, like 
normal children and adults, will find AI tasks more difficult when a 
second dimension varies IW rather than IB; both tasks will be more 
difficult than an RRC task composed of the same two dimensions. 
Furthermore, on tests of RRC transfer, the S_s are expected to show 
evidence of conceptual learning. In combination with Area 2 below, 
it is expected that there will be superior transfer shown on the ^ *s 
preferred or dominant cues. 
2 - Dimension Preference. A moderately retarded S^'s PQ for a 
stimulus dimension, as inferred from a forced-choice preference test, 
will interact with the degree of relevance of that dimension in an AI 
learning task. This implies that if the demonstration of a preference 
reflects a dominant P^ for that dimension, then any changes in the 
relevance of the dimension in an AI setting should be positively 
related to changes in the ease of solution. Such a relationship has 
not been established with retarded ^s in a basic AI learning situation. 
When the dimension with higher P^ is present IW, learning should be 
impeded. In IB tasks, the P^ of the irrelevant dimension should be 
itself irrelevant; if the P^ differential of redundant relevant 
dimensions were great enough, identification of the dimensions with 
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lower PQ values should be of greater difficulty. However, the latter 
effect cannot be evaluated without absolute measurement of which 
is beyond the scope of the present investigation. 
3 - Instructions. With instructions designed to orient the ^ s 
toward conceptual solution, learning will be enhanced as compared to 
instructions which simply orient the Ss to the stimulus-reward contin-
encies of the task. This variable is intended to reflect the in­
structional set differential typically found between experiments using 
adult and those using children or retarded ^s. Since concept-
instructions are intended to provide ^  with a dimensional set, the 
effects of dimensional preference should be enhanced under these 
conditions. 
4 - Analysis of Strategy Behavior. It is expected that the 
application of backward learning and H-score analyses to the data 
will indicate that the retarded do respond to an AI situation in a 
non-random strategic fashion. Relevance of the preferred dimension 
and use of concept-orienting instructions should serve to increase the 
degree as well as the nature of the strategy behavior. The latter 
effect should be characterized by developmentally more advanced 
strategies, i.e., fewer position habits and more outcome-contingent 




A total of 72 residents of Gracewood (Georgia) State School and 
Hospital were selected from a sample of 132 adults, aged 16-35, with 
iQs in the 36-55 range (moderately retarded). Criteria for selection 
were the absence of gross physical handicaps, the ability to pass the 
screening test described below, and demonstration of a consistent 
Color-Form dimension preference. 
Six males and six females, half preferring Color and half 
preferring Form, were assigned to each of 6 groups so that all groups 
were matched on IQ. Age and IQ characteristics of the groups are 
presented in Table 1. Mental age data are not presented as they are 
directly proportional to IQ after age 15. Each group was assigned to 
one of 6 treatment conditions, created by the factors. Type of 




Four subtests from the Leiter International Performance Scale 
(Leiter, 1969) were administered to all potential subjects as follows: 
(#11-1) Matching Colors; (III-l) Matching Forms; (IV-1) Matching Form 
and Color; (IV-4) Matching Form, Color, and Number. Success on two of 
the tasks indicated satisfactory ability to discriminate the patterns 
and colors used in the study. Only 4 ^ s failed the test and were 
removed from the sample. 
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Table 1. Age and IQ characteristics of primary treatment groups 
Group Age IQ 
Mean Range S.D. Mean Range S.D. 
IB-Concept 24.75 16-32 5.14 46.42 38-53 4.85 
IB-Stimulus 24.09 16-34 5.85 47.17 37-55 5.98 
IW-Concept 24.75 16-35 4.92 46.33 38-54 8.33 
IW-Stimulus 23.50 16-28 4.62 47.00 36-55 7.03 
RRC-Concept 24.17 16-35 6.09 46.09 40-51 4.05 
RRC-Stimulus 24.67 16-30 5.12 46.59 38-55 5.81 
Assessment of dimension preference 
Immediately following screening, Color-Form dimension preferences 
were assessed with a 3-choice matching task based on the test used by 
Suchman and Trabasso (1966a). Each 6% in. x 8 in. preference card 
contained three stimulus figures cut from Con-Tact paper and arranged 
so that the distance between any two figures was approximately equal. 
Figures varied on the dimensions of Color (red or blue), Form (circle 
or square), and Size (2.7 sq. in. or 4.5 sq. in.). 
There were eight practice plates, on which two identical figures 
differed from the third on all three dimensions. Color, Form, and 
Size varied independently on twelve test plates and were each repre­
sented by one pair of figures. On six additional test plates, only 
Color and Form varied, with one pair representing an error choice. 
Relative positions of the figures were varied so that any position 
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response bias would result in a random preference score. 
The entire series of 18 test plates was presented once in a pre­
arranged order; the ^ 's task was to "Point to the two figures that 
are alike (or the same)." A sample score sheet is presented in 
Appendix A. 
Apparatus 
All attribute identification (AI) tasks were based on a two-
choice pattern discrimination, with each pattern projected from a 
carousel slide projector onto the back of a separate frosted plexi­
glass stimulus panel. Pressure applied to the stimulus panel tripped 
a microswitch which activated either a door chime, if the response 
was correct, or a 1-sec. buzzer, if the response was incorrect. A 
delay timer advanced the projector to the next slide 2 sec. after 
each response. 
Stimulus panels were 10 cm. x 11 cm. and were separated hori­
zontally by 11 cm. The subjects were seated facing the apparatus, 
which was housed in a black wooden console, with the stimulus panels 
visible at shoulder height. The was seated beside the console at 
all times. 
Experimental Design 
Each AI task consisted of 2-choice pattern discrimination 
training with either Color (red vs. blue) or Form (circle vs. tri­
angle) as the relevant dimension and with the remaining dimension 
varying in one of three ways. In Condition IB, the second dimension 
was irrelevant and varied between trials, e.g.. Trial 1 - red vs. blue 
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circles. Trial 2 - red vs. blue triangles, correct choice always red. 
In Condition IW, this dimension was again irrelevant, but varied 
within each trial, e.g.. Trial 1 - red circle vs. blue triangle. 
Trial 2 - red triangle vs. blue circle, correct choice red. Con­
ditions IB and IW differed only in the pairing of the stimulus 
figures; the same individual stimuli were presented in both cases. 
In Condition BRC, both dimensions were relevant and completely 
redundant, e.g., circles were always red, triangles always blue. 
Subjects assigned to Conditions IB and IW were presented two AI 
tasks with a 4-week delay between tasks to minimize carry-over effects. 
On one task, the ^ 's preferred dimension was relevant with the non-
preferred irrelevant; on the other task, the opposing, non-preferred, 
dimension was relevant with the preferred irrelevant. Presentation 
order of the two tasks was randomized, but remained balanced across 
all experimental variables. Subjects in Condition RRC were presented 
a single AI task in which both the preferred and non-preferred di­
mensions were relevant. 
In order to increase the number of distinct stimulus pairs to a 
total of 16, two additional stimulus factors were inserted. Position 
of the relevant cue (left or right stimulus panel) was varied IW 
throughout and size of the stimulus figures (on a 5-to-3 ratio) was 
varied IB (as well as IW in the RRC task). 
All Ss viewed the stimulus pairs in a constant order based on 
six 12-trial stimulus sequences, as described by Fellows (1967). In 
order to apply these position sequences to the multi-dimensional 
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tasks of the present study, the attributes of each irrelevant di­
mension were keyed to a separate series of two sequences (size to 
#5-#6, position of the relevant cue to #2-#4, and the IB or IW 
dimension to #7-#7). This combination of sequences protected each 
dimension from differential reinforcement due to systematic responding 
on any other dimension. By collating these three sequences, a series 
of 24 stimulus pairs was defined; the series is described in detail 
in Appendix B. Following every 24th pair, the sequence was reversed; 
thus, a complete sequence consisted of 48 stimulus pairs. The 
criterion of successful performance throughout was 10 consecutive 
correct responses. 
Procedure 
Prior to the initial AI task, each was given 5 trials experience 
on a simple discrimination task, in which multi-colored pictures of a 
girl and a football were paired. As this is one of the easiest dis­
crimination tasks for the severely and moderately retarded (Zeaman & 
House, 1963), any ^  failing to leam to "pick the correct picture" on 
4 out of 5 trials was eliminated from the sample. Instructions for 
all were similar to those given to the Stimulus-oriented groups, as 
described below. The pretraining task also served to familiarize ^  
with the mode of responding, the experimenter, and the environment. 
Every attempt was made to put the ^ s at ease. The E was present at 




Prior to each AI task, all assigned to the Concept-oriented 
groups were given the following instructions modeled after those used 
by Klugh and Janssen (1966): 
"Now I want to see how quickly you can solve a puzzle. This 
puzzle has to do with pictures of objects like these (present first 
stimulus pair). You see that these pictures are not alike; in fact, 
they are different in a lot of ways. I'm going to show you some more 
pictures like these. Each time they come on I want you to push the 
picture that's the kind of thing that will ring the bell. All the 
ones that ring the bell are alike in some way. Let's see how quickly 
you can learn what kind of picture makes the bell ring every time. If 
you pick the wrong kind of picture, you'll hear a bad buzzer." 
Before each trial, E said, *Vhich one is the kind of picture that 
rings the bell?" After each response, E said, "Yes, that's the correct 
kind!" or "No, that's the wrong kind!" Periodically, E reminded the 
"Remember, all the ones that ring the bell are alike in some way." 
Stimulus-orienting instructions 
Prior to each AI task, all £s assigned to the Stimulus-oriented 
groups were given the following instructions modeled after those used 
by Kendler and Kendler (1959): 
'\Je are going to play a game, so listen carefully and I'll tell 
you how the game is played. Here are two pictures (first slide). 
When the pictures come on, you will choose one of them and push it. 
If you push the correct one, a bell will ring. If you are wrong. 
35 
you'll hear a bad buzzer. Each time the pictures come on, you can 
choose only one of them. The gave is to see how soon you can ring 
the bell every time you choose." 
Before each trial, jE said, 'Vhich one will ring the bell?" After 
each response, E said, "Yes, that's the correct one!" or "No, that's 
the wrong one!" Periodically, E^ reminded S^, "Remember, the game is 
to see how soon you can ring the bell every time you choose." 
General -procedures 
Subjects were tested individually, and allowed to pace their own 
performance, with the E. present only to give directions, feedback, 
and support. Following ^ 's response, the stimuli remained visible for 
a 2-sec. interval, while the appropriate feedback signals were given. 
No correction was made for incorrect responses; the projector advanced 
to the next slide after each response. Only verbal plus auditory 
feedback was used, since Hamilton (1965) found that the use of tan­
gible rewards with this population tended to distract the ^ 's attention 
away from the stimuli. However, each S was given a small prize fol­
lowing the completion of the session. 
RRC test series 
In order to determine whether attention was focused on either or 
both of the dimensions in Condition RRC, those ^ s were given ten ad­
ditional stimulus pairs after attaining criterion. In four of the 
pairs, the Color variability was replaced by a new constant value 
(grey triangle and circle). In four other pairs, the Form dimension 
was similarly replaced (red and blue stars). The final two pairs 
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contained the same cues as in the original RRC stimuli, but with the 
Color-Form pairings reversed; thus, the two dimensional response 
tendencies would conflict. 
No feedback signals were given ^  during the test series. He 
was simply told that the new pictures were like the ones he had just 
seen, and was asked to choose the pictures that were the kind (like 
the ones) that had been ringing the bell before. 
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Preference Assessement 
An individual's preference score was considered unidimensional, 
if 12 out of 18 responses were to a single dimension, either color or 
form. This 2:1 criterion was met by 119 of 132 or 90% of those Ss 
eligible for inclusion in the experimental sample (IQ 36-55). Of 
those Ss above IQ 55, 95% met the criterion; of those below IQ 36, 
only 38% met criterion. 
Table 2 shows the proportion of S^s, at each IQ interval, who 
were classified as preferring either form or color, or as preferring 
neither dimension (including position and mixed preferences). These 
data were tested for the presence of a monotonie trend with IQ by 
applying Kendall's rank correlation coefficient (tau) (Siegal, 1956). 
Table 2. Proportion of individual preferences by IQ interval 
IQ No. of Ss 
Proportion of individual preferences 
Form Color Neither 
25-35 24 .00 .38 .62 
36-40 34 .23 .65 .12 
41-45 27 .30 .60 .10 
46-50 44 .36 .53 ,11 
51-55 27 .37 .59 .04 
56-60 24 .38 .58 .04 
Total 180 
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The increase in form preference was significant (p < .001), as was the 
decrease in preference for neither dimension (p< .05). No group, 
however, preferred form more frequently than color. 
Analysis of Acquisition Data 
A simple matched groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used as 
a preliminary comparison of the three types of dimensional variability 
(IB, IW, and RRC). This ANOVA was based on the total number of errors 
made by all Ss on their initial tasks. As shown in Table 3, the three 
treatments did differ significantly, with Scheffe* mean comparisons 
indicating that the RRC task (X = 2.79) yielded significantly fewer 
errors (p < .05) than both the IB task (X = 12.29) and the IW task 
(X = 13.67). 
Table 3. Analysis of variance: all initial tasks 
Source df MS F 
Type of variability 2 841.62 4.75* 
^s / type 69 177.22 
S< .05. 
Two learning rate parameters, number of trials to criterion and 
total number of errors, yielded a Pearson product-moment correlation 
of 0.986 and produced comparable results throughout. The trials to 
criterion measure was arbitrarily selected for use in the following 
analyses. 
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IB and IW acquisition 
Only 6 Ss failed to reach criterion on a single AI task (2 from 
Group IB and 4 from Group IW), yielding a relatively high success 
rate of 94%; no failed both of his tasks. Combined data from the 
first and second tasks of Groups IB and IW were examined with a 
repeated measures 3-way ANOVA (Preference x Instructions x Varibility 
X Order x Task) (Winer, 1962).' Because standard deviations and means 
of the sub-groups tended to be correlated, the data were treated with 
a X* = log (x + 1) transformation. Since the transformation did not 
alter the pattern of results, the original data have been presented 
for maximum meaningfulness. A summary of the analysis is shown in 
Table 4. A significant main effect was found for Task (color vs. 
form), indicating that identification of a color concept required 
considerably more trials than did the identification of a form concept. 
All additional results are discussed below under the individual con­
tent areas. 
RRC acquisition 
The design of the RRC condition differed in several respects from 
the previous tasks, and was treated with a separate analysis. A 2-way 
ANOVA (Preference x Instructions) of trials to criterion data yielded 
no significant results and has not been presented. As reported ear­
lier, the Ss had little difficulty with the RRC problem; only two S s  
committed more than five total errors. 
On the RRC test trials, each S was asked to identify four color 
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Table 4. Analysis of variance: all IB and IW tasks 
Source df Mean square 
P (Preference) 1 44.01 —  —  
I (Instructions) 1 90.09 —  —  
V (Variability) 1 11,331.76 8.05* 
0 X T 1 1,312.76 — — 
P X I 1 7,402.59 5.26^ 
P X V 1 152.51 —  —  
I X V 1 2,430.09 1.73 
P X I X V 1 981.76 —  —  
0 X D 1 36.26 —  —  
0 X T X I 1 3,737.51 2.66 
0 X T X V 1 3,914.26 2.78 
c 
Error between 36 1,407.42 
0 (Order) 1 2,677.59 1.92 
T (Task) 1 15,733.76 11.31* 
0 X P 1 1,544.01 1.11 
T X P (Dominance) (D) 1 2,291.26 1.65 
0 X I 1 1,464.84 1.05 
T X I 1 142.59 — — 
0 X V 1 8,085.01 5.81^ 
T X V 1 78.84 —  —  
D X I 1 5,031.51 3.62 
D X V 1 2.34 — —  
0 X P X I 1 78.84 — — 
0 X P X V 1 3,301.76 2.37 
0 X I X V X 437.76 — — 
T X I X V 1 4,690.01 3.37 
c 
Error within 34 1,391.66 
< .01. 
^p< .05. 
^Error terms include all 4- and 5-way interactions. 
41 
Table 5. Analysis of variance: errors on RRC test trials 
Source df Mean square F 
Between 23 1.47 
P (Preference) 1 0.75 --
I (Instructions) 1 0.34 - -
P X I 1 5.50 4.01 
Error (between) 20 1.37 
Within ^ s 24 0.92 
C (Cue) 1 2.09 4.64^ 
P X C (Dominance) (D) 1 4.08 9.07* 
I X C 1 0.32 
P X I X C (D X I) 1 6.53 14.51* 
Error (within) 20 0.45 
% < .01. 
^p< .05. 
stimuli and four form stimuli. Errors made on these two sets of 
stimuli were examined with a repeated measures 3-way ANOVA, which has 
been summarized in Table 5. Again, as on the single-cue AI tasks, 
significantly more errors were made when identifying the color cue. 
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Dimensional Variability 
When an was presented both a color task and a form task, the 
presence of an irrelevant dimension within each stimulus setting did 
impede the rate of ÂI acquisition (see Table 6 for the means and 
standard deviations of all main effect variables). 
The nature of the Variability main effect must be qualified, 
however, by the significance of the Order x Variability interaction. 
The predicted difference between types of irrelevant variability did 
not occur on the initial AI tasks, as was indicated in the preliminary 
3-way ANOVA. The initial equivalence of the IB and IW conditions is 
contrary to previous findings, but could possibly be attributed to 
problem-solving naivete', the discrimination-learning setting being 
a novel experience for all Ss. When the Ss were presented the second 
AI task, simple effects tests showed that those in Group IW took 
significantly more trials to leam, while those in Group IB tended to 
require fewer trials than on the initial task (see Table 7). 
The increase in IW difficulty may be partially explained by the 
fact that the same stimulus pairs were used for both the first and 
second tasks; the second task can be viewed as a delayed ED shift. In 
spite of the one-month delay between problems, the increase in dif­
ficulty supports a number of recent concept-shift studies which find 
that, regardless of age, ED shifting tends to be more difficult than 
Reversal shifting only when the original relevant dimension becomes 
the IW dimension on the shift task (Caron, 1970; Dickerson, Wagner & 
Campione, 1970; Fritz & Blank, 1968). If novel cues had been selected 
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Table 6. Mean trials to criterion: main effect variables 
Variable Mean S.D. 
First task 29.52 35.62 
Second task 40.08 48.96 
Form task 22.00 29.64 
Color task 47.60 50.09 
Color preference 34.12 43.06 
Form preference 35.48 43.22 
Concept-oriented 33.83 42.03 
Stimulus-oriented 35.77 44.21 
Irrelevant between 23.94 38.39 
Irrelevant within 45.67 44.81 
Dominant task 29.92 37.84 
Non-dominant task 39.69 47.35 
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Table 7. Mean trials to criterion: simple interaction effects 
Variability x order 
Variability 1st task 2nd task 
Irrelevant within 31.21 ^ < <  60 . 1 2  
Irrelevant between 27.83 
b 
20.04 
Preference x instructions 
Instructions Color preference Form preference 
Concept-oriented 24.38 43.29 
Stimulus-oriented 43.88 27.66 
Dominance x instructions 
Instructions Dominant task Non-dominant task 
Concept-oriented 21.71 45.96 
Stimulus-oriented 38.12 33.42 
% < .01. 
^p < .05. 
for the second IW task, it is likely that nnich of the negative trans­
fer would have been eliminated (Bilsky & Heal, 1969). 
The various effects of dimensional variability on low-lQ ^ s are 
in agreement with hypothesis-testing models of AI learning. Because 
of the relative ease with which the present tasks were solved, it is 
felt that the population can be approached with more ccmplex forms of 
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AI problems, i.e., multiple-cue sorting tasks and rule-learning 
problems, with a reasonable chance of success. Until such areas 
are tapped, the cognitive capacity of the retardate may be grossly 
under-estimated. Once such areas are explored, it will be possible 
to use more elegant methods of inferring strategy and dimensional 
sets, such as the information analysis described by Osier & Kofsky 
(1965). 
Dimension Preference 
Questions regarding the viability of the dimensional preference 
or dominance concept with mentally retarded adults were not answered 
by the ÂI acquisition data in this study. The acquisition data did 
not directly support the hypothesis that a preference for a dimension 
facilitates the learning of that dimension, e.g.. Task x Preference 
interaction. This interaction is, in effect, a comparison of those 
learning a preferred dimension (dominant) with those learning a 
non-preferred dimension (non-dominant). Thus, the Task x Preference 
interaction can be considered equivalent to a main effect of Domi­
nance (D). 
Preference with redundant cues 
Unlike the AI tasks, the RRC test stimuli reflect a significant 
effect of Dominance (Preference x Cue interaction); nearly twice as 
many errors were made on tests of the non-preferred cue. Scheffe* 
mean comparisons indicated that the ^ s with a preference for form 
made significantly fewer errors on the form cue tests than they 
made on the color cue tests; in addition, their errors were also 
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significantly fewer than the £s with color preferences made on the 
same form cue tests. 
The significant dominance effect found on the RRC tests provides 
additional support for the application of the RRC paradigm to retarded 
as well as normal learners. One of Trabasso & Bower's (1968) basic 
premises was that the stimulus control exerted by individual di­
mensions can be evaluated by a series of transfer tests. In the 
present study, the cue which controlled choice on the preference test 
controlled choice on the RRC test trials and, by implication, con­
trolled attention during RRC acquisition. 
One promising use of the RRC paradigm would be a detailed 
examination of the retardates' ability to respond to compound stimulus 
dimensions. At present, this ability is being explored with a rela­
tively complex learning-set procedure, as seen in House & Zeaman's 
(1963) miniature experiments. Â more direct ccnnparison of the 
Zeaman-House and Trabasso attention models would be possible by com­
parisons of learning-set and RRC data. 
Preference as a situational set 
With a mean Mental Age of approximately 7% years, the bulk of 
the sample lay beyond the point at which preferences are presumed 
to shift to the form dimension. However, the majority of the 
population and 50% of the sample had demonstrated a preference for 
color. In light of the relative ease with which the form tasks 
were solved, it could be argued that a bulk of the demonstrated 
color preferences represented transient shifts in set influenced by 
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prior experience. (Most of the S^s in the sample were attending some 
type of academic program, in which color is used as a prominent 
teaching tool). 
Dimension preferences have recently been found to be task-
specific (01mstead & Sigel, 1970) and have been altered with various 
training procedures. Gaines (1970) assigned young children with 
color and form preferences to discrimination training on either 
their preferred or non-preferred dimension. Preferences were 
assessed again one week later. A significant ninnber of children 
has changed preferences following difficult training on their non-
preferred cues. More lenient training conditions were effective only 
in switching color responders to form, though the frequency of change 
was higher (47% of the sample) than with difficult training. Corah 
(1966) was able to induce a shift in the opposite direction in 
kindergarten children, from form to color preference, by giving 
matching-to-sample training on color cues. 
Johnson, Warner, and Silleroy (1971), using 4%- to 6-year-olds, 
found that learning-set training on one non-preferred dimension, 
i.e., presence of a dot or direction of an arrow, facilitated learning 
on yet another non-preferred dimension, number. Neither simple 
preference testing nor training on the preferred dimension had such 
an effect. The authors suggested that the non-dominant training had 
established a strategy for refecting or inhibiting attention to the 
more salient cues. A preference change was not noted, however, since 
preferences were not re-assessed after training. 
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Evidence that preferences may represent situational sets was also 
found in the Variability x Order interaction of the present study. On 
the initial task, no difference was noted between IB and IW learning 
rates. On the second task, in which the relevancies of the dimensions 
had been reversed, the Ss continued to respond to the dimension which 
had been relevant in the previous task, regardless of preference. In 
other words, perseveration on the irrelevant cues increased markedly. 
It could be argued that the Ss' preferences had been altered, at least 
temporarily, by the initial training experience. 
The preceding discussion emphasizes the importance of the 
distinction between the "availability" and the "usability" of a 
dimensional response (Hitler & Harris, 1969). Availability of a 
dimension is indicated by S_'s consistent responding on a free-choice 
preference test. The degree to which that dimension can function as 
a cue in an AI learning situation indicates the usability of the 
dimension and, apparently, may or may not be related to availability. 
Perhaps a crucial question facing preference research is what are the 
factors which determine or influence free-choice preference responding. 
When a child passes the critical 4- to 6-year age perhaps his per­
ceptual biases become less dominating, only serving to guide his 
behavior in arbitrary choice situations. 
The appearance of significant dominance effects in the RRC data 
can readily be interpreted to support such a premise. During an RRC 
training series, no external constraints are placed on the S in his 
choice of attending to either of the relevant dimensions. Therefore, 
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it would be reasonable to expect that the dimension(s) selected would 
be correlated with the dimension selected on a test of preference. 
Instructional Set 
Instructional set failed to produce a reliable effect on the 
rate of AI acquisition. However, the interaction of this factor with 
Dominance (D x I) was the strongest of those effects approaching 
significance. Since the institutionalized retarded typically yield 
abnormally high error variances, it was felt that this factor should 
be examined for simple effects (see Table 7). It was predicted that 
the Dominance effect would be enhanced by concept-orienting instruc­
tions. The results of simple effect tests did show that the dominant 
dimension was learned significantly faster than was the non-dominant 
dimension, only when the S^s were given concept-orienting instructions; 
stimulus-orienting instructions failed to produce any Dominance effect. 
The Dominance effect described above gives tentative support to 
the notion that conceptual directions can serve to highlight the 
dimensional characteristics of the stimuli for retarded learners. 
But the picture is complicated by an additional Dominance x Instruc­
tions interaction found in the RRC test trial data. Figure 1 shows 
that a dominance effect on the form cue was found with stimulus-
oriented Ss, whereas a dominance effect on the color cue was found 
with concept-oriented Ss. Simple effect tests indicated that only the 
former effect was significant. Perhaps the simpler directions evoked 
consistent dominance responses only in the RRC setting because of the 
free-choice aspects of the task. Again, it is suggested that the 
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Fig. 1. Interaction of preference, type of instruction, and relevant 
cue variables; mean number of errors on four RRC test trials. 
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major effects of perceptual biases and preferences are limited to 
settings which offer an unconstrained choice of dimensional responses. 
It would be instructive to apply both types in directions to simple 
preference and optional-shift tasks. 
An additional interaction effect reaching significance, that of 
Preference x Instructions in the AI data, was an unexpected result 
and cannot be interpreted without additional data. The means in 
Table 7 showed that Ss having a preference for color reached cri­
terion more rapidly when presented with concept-orienting instructions. 
Those having a preference for form, however, learned more rapidly with 
stimulus-orienting instructions. These two simple effects were of 
nearly equal magnitude, but were not significant. 
Further research is suggested regarding the response of the 
retarded to more sophisticated types of conceptual instructions. It 
should be noted that, despite attempts to make the conceptual in­
structions used here parallel to those used in current AI research, 
they actually little information about the problem-solving nature of 
the task other than the references to types of stimuli and the need 
for consistency. In retrospect, it would appear that this investi­
gator was also guilty, as has been the custom among psychologists, 
of "watering-down" the complexity of any directions given the retarded. 
The implicit assumption that moderately retarded individuals cannot 
understand and profit from more sophisticated instruction has yet to 
be fairly evaluated. 
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Analysis of Response Strategies 
Backward learning curves 
As a preliminary to the analysis of response strategies, an 
empirical (forward) learning curve depicting group acquisition of the 
combined IB and IW data was plotted in Figure 2. To put this curve 
into traditional form, each S_*s data has been extended to the full 150 
trials by assuming errorless performance following the criterion run. 
Paralleling this negatively accelerated curve is a cumulative plot of 
the percentage of Ss having reached criterion. The contiguity of the 
two curves suggests that the group curve reflects the distribution of 
individual leaiming rates rather than depicting an average individual's 
learning rate. 
A further step in clarifying the course of the ^ s' learning has 
been depicted in Figure 3, where acquisition of the color and form 
tasks has been plotted in terms of backward learning curves. To aid 
in the interpretation of these curves, the abscissa variable. Blocks, 
has been numbered from right-to-left, i.e.. Block 1 refers to the ^ s' 
first 10 trials prior to the error which preceded the criterion run. 
As the Block number increases, of course, more ^ s will have reached 
criterion; thus, the N increases as the abscissa value grows smaller. 
As can be seen, the color and form curves both hover relatively close 
to chance levels throughout the precriterion phase of learning, never 
exceeding 70% correct choice. The curve for the form task, which was 
significantly easier than color, begins in a later block, but roughly 
parallels the color curve. In Figure 4, backward curves comparing the 
Fig. 2. Group (forward) learning curves for all Ss solving 
(N = 90); percent correct per 10-trial block and 
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IB and IW tasks display a similar pattern of results, with the 
exception of the slope of the IB curve, which appears more erratic 
than might be expected from chance. The performance of the six non-
learners also failed to rise much above chance levels throughout the 
full 150 trials; their data have not been presented. 
Precriterion strategies «««BsaBKa 
Since attention theory postulates that the precriterion phase of 
learning is a period when S. is testing a variety of hypotheses about 
the relationships between the stimulus dimensions and reinforcement, 
each S^'s choice data was inspected for indications of hypothesis 
behavior. The data for this analysis were generated with Fellows' 
(1967) Hypothesis Habit statistic (H-score), as follows; 
1) Each S^'s data was inspected for continuous sequences of each 
of the four basic Hs (perseveration, alternation, win-stay;lose-shift, 
and lose-8tay:win-shift) with respect to each of the three stimulus 
dimensions (Position, Relevant Cue, and Irrelevant Cue). 
2) H-sequences of 5 trials or less were considered chance and 
were given a score of zero. Â sequence of 6 trials was scored as 1, 
a sequence of 7 was scored as 2, a sequence of 8 as 3, etc. For each 
of the Ss, the resulting values were summed within each strategy and 
entered as the H-score data for that £. 
3) Since lose-8tay;win-shift behavior was negligible, having a 
total H-score of only 20, this strategy was not considered separately 
from its counter-part, win-stay:lose-shift. 
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Data for 44 (30 from Group IB and 14 from Group IW), who had 
reached criterion in less than 10 trials, were excluded from the 
analysis, since insufficient strategy behavior was established. Mean 
H-scores for the remaining 52 £s (18 IB and 34 IW) are depicted in 
Figure 5. The dominating IB strategy and the most prevalent strategy 
overall was Position Contingency. Position Alternation was the next 
most frequent strategy, showing equal incidence in both groups. The 
highest H-score in the IW group was related to perseveration on the 
Irrelevant dimension which was present in their tasks. The most 
basic strategy. Position Perseveration, was used infrequently through­
out. H-scores for all other strategies, including all Relevant 
dimension hypotheses (other than solution), were negligible. It 
should be noted that the two groups in this sub-sample did not differ 
appreciably in mean trials to criterion (IW = 62.18, IB = 58.67). 
Though it shall remain an issue for individual interpretation, 
the backward learning curves appear to offer a more realistic 
representation of the course of an S_'s learning in the present study 
than do the traditional curves- This interpretation is supported by 
the magnitude of strategic behavior (determined by H-scores) found 
prior to solution, bearing in mind that each Individual component of 
an H-score represents a run of at least 6 responses to a non-relevant 
dimension. 
Group differences in strategy behavior 
In an attempt to relate the strategy data to the experimental 
variables, the IW data were prepared for a 4-way ANOVA (Instructions 
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Fig. 5. Mean H-scores for S^s in Groups IB and IW solving 
in 10 or more trials to criterion 
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X Task X Preference x Order) in the following manner. Since the N's 
for the four Instruction x Preference sub-groups were unequal (N = 
7,8,9,10), data for 6 of the Ss were eliminated so that each sub­
group contained 7 ^ s. Those eliminated were chosen randomly from 
appropriate groups so that sub-groups of each of the two-factor 
interactions (with the unavoidable exception of Preference x Order) 
were also composed of 7 ^ s. The Dominance (T x P) x Instructions 
factor also had sub-groups of 7 ^ s, and was included in the analysis. 
All other three factor sub-groups were ccmposed of either 3 or 4 Ss 
.and were included in the error terms. 
The resultant ANOVA was applied in turn to the H-scores based on 
Position Alternation (P^), Position Contingency (Pg), and Irrelevant 
Cue Perseveration (Ip). The results of these ANOVAs are shown, re­
spectively, in Tables 8, 9, and 10. H-scores for all other strategies 
were negligible and not subject to analysis. 
Summary of effects 
A summary of the main effects of the treatment variables on the 
three strategies is presented in Figure 6. The H-score analysis of 
Position Alternation indicated significant main effects of all four 
treatment variables, plus a significant interaction effect of 
Dominance. The net result of these effects was an increase in P^ 
habits occurring with stimulus-oriented instructions, with form 
preference, with color as the relevant cue, and with the non-dominant 
dimension relevant; there was also a decrease in P^ on the S^s' second 
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Table 8. Analysis of variance of H-scores from IW data: position 
alternation 
Source df Mean square F 
I (Instructions) 32.14 8.19* 
T (Task) 1 137.29 13.14b 
P (Preference) 1 89.29 22.75b 
0 (Order) 1 24.15 6.15* 
T X P (Dominance) (D) 1 51.57 13.14^ 
I X T 1 32.14 8.19* 
I X P 1 0.14 
I X 0 1 51.57 13.14b 
I X D 1 17.29 4.40 
T X 0 1 11.56 2.95 
Error 17 3.92 
< .05. 
^P< .005. 
task. Position Contingency habits also increased significantly under 
the stimulus-oriented condition. 
The Irrelevant Perseveration data indicated a significant increase 
is the use of 1^ when color was the relevant cue. This strategy also 
yielded a significant Order effect, but in the direction opposite to 
that found in the P^ data, i.e., an increase in Ip occurred on the 
second task. 
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Table 9. Analysis of variance of H-scores from IW data: position 
contingency 
Source df Mean square F 
I (Instructions) 234.32 8.73b 
T (Task) 1 18.89 --
P (Preference) 1 38.89 1.45 
0 (Order) 1 0.89 — -
T X P (Dominance) (D) 1 2.89 --
I X T 10.33 — — 
I X P 1 124.33 4.64* 
I X 0 1 0.33 — -
I X D 1 1.76 - -
T X 0 1 0.04 — — 
Error 17 26.82 
< .05 
^P< .01 
H-scores versus learning rate measures 
Application of the H-scores data to the independent variables in 
the study strongly supports results from the basic acquisition data. 
The greater difficulty of the second IW task was associated with a 
significant decrease in habits and an increase in Ip habits. In 
addition, the color task, more difficult than the form task, also 
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Table 10. Analysis of variance of H-scores from IW data: Irrelevant 
perseveration 
Source df Mean square F 
I (Instructions) 1 137.28 2.83 
T (Task) 1 343.00 7.08* 
P (Preference) 1 120.14 2.48 
0 (Order) 1 302.28 6.24* 
T X P (Dominance) (D) 1 41.28 --
I X T 1 137.29 2.83 
I X P 1 0.15 --
I X 0 1 112.01 2.31 
I X D 1 17.29 --
T X 0 1 252.00 5.20* 
Error 17 48.47 
< .05. 
yielded greater amounts of both and Ip responding. Thus, H-score 
measures did appear to mimic the learning rate measures in their 
sensitivity to several task variables. Further study will be needed 
to determine if behaviors represented by H-scores are themselves 
causative factors in AI learning difficulty. If so, they may serve 
as potential antecedents for mediated learning studies and as pre­
scriptive anchors for remediation techniques. 
Fig. 6. Mean H-score comparisons for all main effect variables; 
starred comparisons reached significance 
67 
Stimulus Inst. 
O- Concept Inst. 
/ 
O-lst Task X 
X-2nd Task 
o- Form Task X 









Pa P, c ^P 
TYPE OF STRATEGY 
A 
•A\ r T r 
P^ It 
'A C^ "-P 
O- Dominant Cue 
X- Non-dominant Cue 
O- Prefer Color X 
X- Prefer Form 
— f  1 1— 
PÀ Pq ^P 
-\V- J 1— 
^A ^C ^P 
TYPE OF STRATEGY 
68 
One example of the diagnostic potential of H-score analysis is 
evident in the significant Ip interaction of Task x Order. The Ss 
displayed significantly more Ip on the second task when it was based 
on color cues than when based on form cues; this amount was greater 
than shown on either initial task. Such a result would suggest that 
the high degree of form perseveration exhibited on color might be 
attributed to negative transfer from the prior presentation of a 
form task. In other words, after exposure to a problem based on form 
cues, the Ss continued to respond to the same cues on the second 
problem; there was no such effect when a color task was presented 
first. This would suggest that shifting from a potent dimension, such 
as form, to a more subtle cue may be delayed and may require additional 
cueing and instruction. An understanding of such an effect may assist 
the academic teacher as well as the conceptual-shift researcher. 
Instructions 
When extended to instructional effects, which were not supported 
by the acquisition data, the H-score data provides some interesting 
results. A.S predicted, concept-orienting instimetions yielded signifi­
cantly fewer Position habits (both and Pg) than did stimulus-
orienting instructions. Because of the high incidence of position 
errors typically found with the mentally retarded (Ellis et al., 1962; 
Schusterman, 1964) and with preschool and kindergarten children (Croll, 
1970; Carmean & Carmean, 1971), it may be profitable to further assess 
the impact of the directions given to immature subjects. 
Instructional effects also interacted significantly with several 
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other variables. Individual comparisons were made on the simple ef­
fects of these interactions, using Scheffe' mean comparison tests at 
the .05 level of significance, with the following results: 
1) Instructions x Order interaction - The significant reduction 
in from the first to the second task, described previously, was 
displayed only by those Ss receiving the concept-oriented instructions. 
The reduced level was significantly lower than shown on both of the 
stimulus-oriented tasks. 
2) Instructions x Task interaction - Subjects exposed to a 
stimulus-oriented color task exhibited significantly more than was 
found on all other tasks. Thus, it appears that the combined presence 
of the more difficult task, color, and the stimulus-oriented directions 
served to increase the strength of the P^. strategy. 
3) Instructions x Preference interaction - Those Ss having a 
preference for the form dimension exhibited more Pq habits when pre­
sented with stimulus- rather than concept-oriented instructions. 
It would appear, based on the accumulated evidence, that in­
structing the S_ to observe the kind or type of stimulus may serve to 
inhibit his responsiveness to the simple location of that stimulus. 
It should also be noted that increased levels of P^ habits were 
similarly associated with requiring the S_ to identify his non-dominant 
dimension; moreover, high P^ was produced with each of those factors 
originally expected to cause increases in problem difficulty. Ad­
ditional research may show that with further increases in the dif­
ficulty. Additional research may show that with further increases in 
.70 
problem difficulty. Additional research may show that with further 
increases in the difficulty of AI problems, and in the dimensional 
emphasis of the instructions, corresponding increases in position 
habits may be of a strength to actively inhibit learning rate. 
Implications for Future Study 
It is felt that the results of this investigation concur with 
the following statement by Hartup & Yonas (1971): 
There is increasing evidence that children learn 
simple discrimination tasks in an all-or-none fashion. 
Not even children with low iQs improve gradually on such 
tasks....Experimental findings are consistent with the 
notion that a process of hypothesis generation and 
testing occurs, even in very young children (p. 360). 
AI acquisition by the moderately retarded did appear to occur in 
an all-or-none fashion and a significant amount of simple hypothesis 
testing was generated during the presolution period. An obvious con­
clusion is that strategy behavior is an available response which can 
be modified and developed in the retarded. This suggests that the 
retarded can be given training in more systematic and strategic modes 
of reasoning and, consequently, can develop more adaptive and in­
dependent learning skills. Substantial numbers of retarded learners 
lack the reasoning strategies required for skills such as stating 
word definitions, completing analogies, using clustered recall, 
analyzing visual sequences, and identifying conceptual similarities. 
In a recent approach to the latter skill, Mclvor (1972) was successful 
in teaching mildly retarded (IQ 50 to 70) adolescents a strategy for 
"testing-out" and finding a descriptive property common to a triad of 
nouns. 
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Several questions thus beg for immediate attention, such as: 
Can the moderately and mildly retarded leam to use additional 
hypothesis-testing strategies?; Will the learning of such strategies 
further the conceptual development of the retarded?; and What system­
atic strategies are available to the more severely retarded? Future 
research into the strategies generated by and necessary for complex 
AX learning may help to supply the answers, which can provide teachers 
of the mentally retarded with valuable tools for modifying some of the 
learning handicaps fundamental to retardation. 
The psychologist's role in treatment facilities for the retarded 
has been rapidly changing. Instead of merely describing and predicting 
behavior, he is being assigned the task of producing the predicted 
behaviors. Currently, the emphasis is on producing self-care skills 
and on eliminating abberant behaviors and proponents of behavior 
modification techniques have answered the challenge. The next chal­
lenge to be issued concerns what the psychologist can do to produce 
more intelligent behaviors in the retarded (Throne, 1972). An open 
field awaits the cognitive psychologist to apply some of the funda­
mentals of conceptual learning. 
Whether or not the mentally retarded individual can acquire 
greater cognitive flexibility remains to be proven or disproven. How­
ever, a person, especially one who has been sheltered in an institution, 
should not be expected to perform at a level beyond the one on which he 
is approached. The intellectual output required of the retarded per­
son in his daily routine, as well as in the laboratory, is all too 
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often far below his actual capabilities. Researchers should be able 
to demand and receive more mature thought processes from the retarded 
simply by providing information, structuring tasks, and directing 
studies on a more normalized, adult level. The point of difficulty 
at which any level of retardate can no longer comprehend and compete 
has yet to be determined empirically. Once determined, the search 
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE PREFERENCE SCORESHEET 
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NAME COTTAGE DATE GROUP 
PREFERENCE TEST 
(1) P (9) F (17) C (25) F 
X C F C 
X S X S 
(2) X (10) C (18) F (26) S 
X S X F 
P F C C 
(5) P (13) C (21) C 
X X F 
X F S 
(6) X (14) C (22) S 
P F C 
X S F 
(7) X (15) S (23) C 
P C S 
X F F 
(8) P (16) F (24) X 
X S F 
X C C 
(3) X (11) S (19) X 
P F C Choice Code 
X C F 
P = Matching pair 
(4) X (12) F (20) F X = Error 
X C S F = Form 
P X C C = Color 
S = Size 
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APPENDIX B: DEFINITION OF STIMULUS SEQUENCE 
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Dlmens ion Cue Code 
(P) Position 1 = Left 2 = Right 
(S) Size 1 = Large 2 = Small 
(I) IB and IW 1 = Red 2 = Blue 
1 = Triangle 2 = Circle 
Nos. 
1-12 1-1-1 13-24 1-2-1 25-36 1-1-2 37-48 1-2-2 
>1^  >1/ V Y 
2-2-1 1-1-1 2-2-2 1-1-2 
1-2-2 2-1-2 1-2-2 2-1-2 
1-1-1 2-2-1 1-1-1 2-2-1 
2-1-1 2-2-1 2-1-2 2-2-2 
2-1-1 1-2-1 2-1-2 1-2-2 
2-2-2 1-1-2 2-2-1 1-1-1 
1-2-2 1-1-2 1-2-1 1-1-1 
1-2-1 2-1-1 1-2-1 2-1-1 
1-1-2 2-2-2 1-1-2 2-2-2 
2-1-2 1-2-2 2-1-1 1-2-1 
2-2-2 2-1-2 2-2-1 2-1-1 
Example: 2-1-2 = Large Blue Circle on the Right 
Paired with; Large Red Circle (IB Color) 
Large Blue Triangle (IB Form) 
Large Red Triangle (IW) 
